Metanormative Regress: An Escape Plan by Tarsney, Christian
Metanormative Regress: An Escape Plan
Christian J. Tarsney∗
(Version 7, August 2019)
Comments welcome: christian.tarsney@philosophy.ox.ac.uk.
Abstract
How should you decide what to do when you’re uncertain about basic nor-
mative principles (e.g., Kantianism vs. utilitarianism)? A natural suggestion
is to follow some “second-order” norm: e.g., comply with the first-order norm
you regard as most probable or maximize expected choiceworthiness. But what
if you’re uncertain about second-order norms too—must you then invoke some
third -order norm? If so, it seems that any norm-guided response to norma-
tive uncertainty is doomed to a vicious regress. In this paper, I aim to rescue
second-order norms from this threat of regress. I first elaborate and defend
the suggestion some philosophers have entertained that the regress problem
forces us to accept normative externalism, the view that at least one norm
is incumbent on agents regardless of their beliefs or evidence concerning that
norm. But, I then argue, we need not accept externalism about first-order
(e.g., moral) norms, thus closing off any question of what an agent should
do in light of her normative beliefs. Rather, it is more plausible to ascribe
external force to a single, second-order rational norm: the enkratic princi-
ple, correctly formulated. This modest form of externalism, I argue, is both
intrinsically well-motivated and sufficient to head off the threat of regress.
1 Introduction
How should an agent decide what to do when she is uncertain about basic normative
principles—for instance, when she is uncertain whether Kantianism or utilitarianism
is the true moral theory and faces a choice for which those theories offer conflicting
advice? Many philosophers have thought that such an agent should decide what to
do by means of some higher-order normative principle. For instance, according to
“My Favorite Theory” (MFT), she should act on the first-order normative theory she
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regards as most probably correct. According to “My Favorite Option” (MFO), she
should choose the option that has the greatest total probability of being objectively
right or permissible. According to still other views, she should weigh the reasons put
forward by the various first-order normative theories against one another, perhaps by
choosing the option that is best in expectation, given her credences over first-order
theories.1 The view that normatively uncertain agents should make deliberative use
of some such higher-order norms has been dubbed metanormativism (MacAskill,
2014).
Though the need for higher-order norms may seem inescapable, all forms of
metanormativism face a challenge: If an agent who is uncertain about first-order
normative principles must decide what to do by means of some second-order princi-
ple, must not an agent who is uncertain about second -order principles decide what
to do by means of some third -order principle—and likewise for every higher order
of normative belief? Without some guarantee that, in the course of ascending to
higher-order normative principles, a rational agent will eventually reach a point at
which she experiences no further uncertainty (being certain that some nth-order nor-
mative principle is correct), won’t the appeal to higher-order norms involve her in
an infinite regress that prevents her from ever reaching a rationally guided decision?
This apparent regress is a threat to metanormativism, and to the philosophical
project of identifying norms of choice under normative uncertainty.2 The easiest way
to avoid the regress problem, it might seem, is to eschew higher-order norms entirely
and instead adopt the view I will call first-order externalism, according to which the
true first-order (e.g., moral) norms are incumbent on all agents regardless of their
1Versions of MFT are defended by Gracely (1996) and Gustafsson and Torpman (2014). MFO
is considered and rejected by Lockhart (2000) (under the name “PR2”), Gustafsson and Torpman
(2014), and MacAskill and Ord (forthcoming). Expectational views are defended by Lockhart
(2000), Ross (2006), Sepielli (2009), MacAskill and Ord (forthcoming), and Riedener (forthcoming),
among others. Other metanorms have been proposed by Guerrero (2007), Nissan-Rozen (2012),
MacAskill (2016), Tarsney (2018, forthcoming), and Greaves and Cotton-Barratt (Greaves and
Cotton-Barratt), among others.
2This threat has been noted by Lockhart (2000, pp. 36–7), Sepielli (2010, pp. 267ff), MacAskill
(2014, pp. 217–9), Bykvist (2013, pp. 132–4), Weatherson (2014, 2019) and Riedener (2015, pp.
25–31, 91–2), among others.
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beliefs or evidence. On this view, an agent who is uncertain about first-order norms
simply ought to do what the true first-order norms require of her, even if she has
no way of identifying those norms and even if her evidence leads her rationally to
reject them and to place most of her credence in rival norms. Thus, for instance, if
eating factory-farmed meat is in fact morally permissible, and slightly prudentially
better than any alternative diet, then even an agent who believes on the basis of
compelling arguments that it is almost certainly a serious moral wrong ought to eat
meat anyway, in every interesting sense of “ought.”3
In this paper, I propose a solution to the metanormative regress problem. My
solution preserves metanormativism, and hence the idea that what we ought to do
(in at least one important sense of “ought”) depends on our normative beliefs. But
it also concedes an important point to opponents of metanormativism: There must
be some normative principle whose normative force does not depend on an agent’s
beliefs, and which therefore is incumbent on an agent even if she justifiably rejects
that principle itself. Conceding this limited form of “normative externalism” is the
price we must pay to avoid a vicious regress. But, I will argue, both externalism
in general and my version of externalism in particular have strong independent
motivations, and are not merely an ad hoc response to the threat of regress.
In the next section, I introduce some conceptual scaffolding for the rest of the
paper. In §3, I set out the regress problem as an argument for normative external-
ism. I examine two internalist responses and conclude that they are unsatisfactory.
In §4, I introduce my own response to the regress problem, which posits a single
belief-independent norm of practical rationality: the enkratic principle, correctly
formulated. I argue that this form of externalism is both prima facie plausible
and draws support from considerations independent of the regress problem. This
“enkratic externalist” position satisfies the demands of the regress argument for ex-
3Weatherson (2014, 2019) takes the regress problem, among other considerations, to support
precisely this view. First-order externalism has also been defended on other grounds by Harman
(2015) and Hedden (2016).
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ternalism, but that doesn’t necessarily mean it solves the regress problem. In §5, I
describe two ways in which the enkratic externalism might fail to block the regress
and try to plug both these gaps. §6 is the conclusion.
2 Internalism, externalism, and metanormativism
2.1 Choice situations and norms
A choice situation is an ordered triple Si = 〈Ai,Oi, Cri〉, where Ai is an agent, Oi
is a finite set of options {Oi1, Oi2, ..., Oin} available to Ai in Si, and Cri is Ai’s cre-
dence function. Each option is understood as a vector of properties that completely
specifies all its normatively relevant features.
A norm is a principle for making normative assessments of options in the con-
text of particular choice situations. Formally, we can understand a norm as a set of
propositions closed under logical consequence that includes such normative assess-
ments. I leave it open exactly what form these assessments take (e.g., a preordering
of options or an assignment of real numbers), except to stipulate that all norms have
the purpose of identifying some options as permissible and others as impermissible.4
That is, every norm must include at least some propositions to the effect that partic-
ular options are permissible or impermissible in particular choice situations. Thus,
any norm is associated with two functions: one that maps some or all choice situa-
tions to choice sets of options that the norm designates as permissible in that choice
situation, and another that maps choice situations to prohibited sets of options it
designates as impermissible. (These functions are not redundant, as we will see,
since a norm may be only partial: It may classify some options in a choice situation
as permissible and others as impermissible, while leaving still others unclassified.)
4These notions should be understood very thinly. To say that an option is “permissible” is
just to say that it is possible for an agent who is in some relevant sense normatively ideal (fully
rational and, in the case of objective norms, fully informed) to choose that option. To say that an
option is “impermissible” is just to say that such an agent would not choose that option.
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2.2 Objective and subjective norms
Say that a norm N is sensitive to a given feature of a choice situation if, for some
minimal pair of choice situations Si and Sj that differ only with respect to that
feature, containing a minimal pair of options Oik ∈ Oi and Ojl ∈ Oj that differ
only with respect to that feature, N implies that Oik is permissible in Si but O
j
l is
impermissible in Sj. In particular, a norm N is sensitive to an agent’s beliefs about
some set of propositions Σ if there is some minimal pair of choice situations Si and
Sj that differ only with respect to the agent’s credences over propositions in Σ, such
that N designates some minimal pair of options permissible in Si but impermissible
in Sj. In other words, a norm is sensitive to an agent’s belief about a given subject
matter if, according to that norm, those beliefs can make the difference between an
otherwise identical option being permissible or impermissible.
An objective norm is sensitive to empirical and counterfactual features of choice
situations, like the fact that a particular option would have a particular consequence.
And its sensitivity to these features is not mediated by the agent’s credences: For
instance, an objective norm may assess a given option as impermissible because
it would harm some third party, even if the agent does not believe or have any
evidence that it would. The output of an objective norm is an assessment of options
in terms of choiceworthiness, i.e., the degree of objective reason the agent has to
choose a given option, and a designation of options as either objectively permissible
or objective prohibited.
A subjective norm, on the other hand, is sensitive only to facts about the agent’s
mental states, in particular her beliefs and/or evidence.5 Just as objective norms
yield an assessment of options in terms of objective reasons and designate options
as objectively permissible/prohibited, so subjective norms yield an assessment of
5I will hereafter use “beliefs” to mean “beliefs and/or evidence,” remaining neutral on whether
the true subjective norms are sensitive to an agent’s beliefs, her evidence, or both. Likewise,
references to an agent’s “credences” should be understood to mean “either subjective credences,
or evidential/epistemic probabilities, or some combination of the two.”
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options in terms of subjective reasons and designate options as subjectively or ratio-
nally permissible/prohibited.
2.3 Higher-order subjective norms
All subjective norms, I assume, are sensitive to (at least some features of) an agent’s
non-normative beliefs—e.g., her beliefs about the consequences of her options or
about what promises she has made. A first-order subjective norm is sensitive only
to the agent’s non-normative beliefs, and insensitive to her normative beliefs. A
second-order subjective norm is sensitive to (i) the agent’s non-normative beliefs as
well as (ii) her beliefs about objective norms and/or first-order subjective norms,
but insensitive to her beliefs about higher-order subjective norms. For finite n > 2,
an nth-order subjective norm is sensitive to the agent’s non-normative beliefs as
well as her beliefs regarding norms of order n−1 (and possibly lower-order norms as
well), but not her beliefs regarding norms of order n or greater. And more generally,
for any subjective norm N that is not first- or second-order, the order of N is the
least ordinal greater than every order of normative belief to which N is sensitive.
(Henceforth I will omit the word “subjective” and simply refer to “first-order norms,”
“second-order norms,” etc.)6,7
6We could assign orders to subjective norms more elegantly by simply saying that for any
subjective norm N , the order of N is the least ordinal greater than every order of subjective
normative belief to which N is sensitive. But then we would lose the distinction between norms
that are sensitive only to the agent’s empirical beliefs and those that are sensitive to her objective
normative beliefs, and would classify norms in a way that does not match the standard usage
of “first-order” and “second-order” in the normative uncertainty literature. So I have adopted
unnecessarily clunky definitions in order to interface better with the existing debate.
7Could there also be norms that are sensitive to an agent’s normative beliefs at every order,
or at an upwardly unbounded collection of orders? I’m not sure, but I think we ought to set this
possibility aside. One the one hand, we might wish to rule out such norms as potential sources
of paradox (just as, in standard set theory, upwardly-unbounded sets of ordinals are ruled out
by the Burali-Forti paradox). On the other hand, if we allow such norms, then they themselves
become potential objects of uncertainty, and that uncertainty will beget yet further metanorms. So
we would only have succeeded in extending the metanormative hierarchy from ordinal to “super-
ordinal” norms, without changing our situation in any fundamental way.
The essential point is that, like the ordinals themselves, the metanormative hierarchy appears
to be “indefinitely extensible”: We have a general procedure for going from any identified totality
T of orders to a new order not contained in T—namely, the order of those norms that are sensitive
to an agent’s beliefs about all and only the norms in T . For useful discussion of the challenges
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I have said that subjective norms are norms of rational requirement. This de-
serves a little explanation. A key substantive presupposition throughout this pa-
per is that subjective norms tell us how to respond to our beliefs about normative
phenomena in the world. That is, a true subjective norm specifies the appropri-
ate response to a given belief state concerning objective and/or subjective reasons.
Thus, a subjective norm is a kind of coherence requirement: It demands coherence
between my beliefs about reasons and my choices/intentions. I find it convenient
to identify “rationality” with this sort of coherence: Responding correctly to, or
making choices that cohere with, one’s beliefs about reasons, sounds a lot like ra-
tionality.8 But this is a terminological matter on which, as far as I can see, nothing
of great substance depends. I would be equally happy, for instance, to defend all
the arguments and conclusions of this paper if a concept like “subjective ought” or
“subjective rightness” were substituted for “rational requirement” throughout—and
the reader should feel free to make the substitution.9
2.4 Internal and external subjective norms
Say that a choice situation S is in the domain of a norm N if N asserts of some option
in S that it is permissible or asserts of some option in S that it is impermissible—i.e.,
if either N ’s choice set for S or N ’s prohibited set for S or both are non-empty. Say
that N is domain-restricted by an agent’s beliefs about some set of propositions Σ
if, for some possible belief state with respect to Σ, no choice situation in which the
raised by indefinite extensibility, see for instance Hellman (2006) and Shapiro and Wright (2006).
8The link between rationality and coherence is not uncontroversial, of course. For a contrary
view, see for instance Lord (2017).
9One might worry that, by framing the debate in terms of rationality, I am talking past
opponents of metanormativism like Weatherson, Harman, and Hedden, who are often understood
to be interested in properties like moral rightness rather than rational requirement. But I am
talking past these philosophers only if they are prepared to concede metanormativism as a thesis
about rationality. And it seems clear that they are not, because they deny the need for any kind of
metanorms. For instance, Harman writes: “Because Uncertaintism [≈ metanormativism] is false,
the puzzle we discussed above, about how to compare moral value between conflicting moral views,
is not important. It may be interesting as a puzzle; but nothing normatively important hangs on
solving it” (Harman, 2015, p. 58). And Hedden writes: “There is no normatively interesting sense
of ought in which what you ought to do depends on your uncertainty about (fundamental) moral
facts” (Hedden, 2016, p. 104).
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agent has that belief state is in the domain of N .
Although an nth-order norm is not sensitive to an agent’s nth-order normative
beliefs, it can be domain-restricted by those beliefs. In this case, we will call it an
internal norm. The paradigm of an internal norm is a norm N that applies only to
choice situations in which the agents satisfies some threshold of belief with respect to
N itself. Such a norm can be expressed as a conditional: “For any agent who believes
N to such-and-such degree [e.g., with certainty], ϕ,” where ϕ makes reference only
to the agent’s non-normative beliefs and her normative beliefs of order less than n.
Because subjective norms can be internal, it is possible for two apparently competing
subjective norms to be true, despite the fact that all subjective norms assess options
in terms of the same normative concepts: For instance, perhaps the true first-order
norm says that agents ought to maximize expected hedonic welfare, while the true
second-order norm says that agents ought to act on the first-order norm they consider
most probable. On face, these two norms can disagree about what a given agent
ought to do in a given choice situation, and so can’t both be true at the same
time. But if the first-order norm applies only to agents who believe that norm with
certainty, then there is no conflict: Whenever both norms apply to a given choice
situation, they yield the same permissions and prohibitions.
An external nth-order norm, by contrast, has no such domain restriction: Whether
it applies to a given agent does not depend on that agent’s nth-order normative be-
liefs. Externalism, then, is the thesis that there is at least one true external norm.
Internalism is the thesis that all true norms are internal.10
10The internalist/externalist distinction is borrowed from Weatherson (2014, 2019), though I
characterize it somewhat differently than he does. (For Weatherson’s characterization, see in
particular §1.3 of Weatherson (2019).) Other philosophers have recognized the same distinction in
various terms. For instance, Broome endorses the view I am calling externalism when he says that
some norms impose “strict liability” (e.g., in Broome (2013, pp. 91ff)). Bykvist (2013) endorses the
same thesis when he writes: “[M]y tentative conclusion is that in cases of uncertainty of rational
matters there is an answer to the question of what it is rational to prefer which is not sensitive
to your own views about rationality” (p. 133). Lin (2014) endorses a different form of externalism
based on the idea of “adaptive rationality.” And I take Elga (2010) to endorse externalism in the
epistemic domain when he says that certain epistemic norms “must be dogmatic with respect to
their own correctness” (p. 185). (Although Elga’s focus is on epistemic norms, he seems to endorse
externalism regarding practical norms as well when he claims that this requirement of dogmatism
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2.5 Metanormativism and first-order externalism
An nth-order subjective norm N is comprehensive if (i) for every choice situation
S in its domain, it classifies every option in S as either rationally permissible or
rationally impermissible and (ii) its domain includes (at least) every choice situation
in which the agent believes all the propositions in N with probability 1. Condition
(ii) allows that internal norms may be comprehensive. Because whether a given
choice situation is in the domain of an external norm never depends on the agent’s
nth-order normative beliefs, a comprehensive external norm applies to every choice
situation whatsoever. (Note, however, that even a comprehensive external norm
need not be complete in the formal sense: It may imply, for instance, that certain
options are incomparable.)
Now we can characterize metanormativism and its competitor, first-order ex-
ternalism. Metanormativsm is the view that there is at least one true second- or
higher-order subjective norm (i.e., a true nth-order subjective norm for some n > 1).
Thus, metanormativism asserts that what an agent rationally ought to do sometimes
depends on her purely normative beliefs, and is not determined solely by her empir-
ical and other non-normative beliefs. The rival view, first-order externalism, asserts
that there is a true comprehensive external first-order norm, N1∗ . This implies that
there are no true higher-order norms: Since N1∗ is comprehensive and external, it
applies to every choice situation and fully determines the subjective normative prop-
erties of all options in any choice situation to which it applies. Therefore, any true
subjective norm can only yield normative assessments that agree with N1∗ , on pain of
contradiction. But, since N1∗ is a first-order norm, any norm that always agrees with
N1∗ is insensitive to the agent’s normative beliefs, and therefore is also first-order.
The thesis I will defend in the coming sections, then, is that the regress problem
forces us to accept some form of externalism but does not force us to accept first-
order externalism—rather, the most plausible response to the regress problem is a
applies to any “fundamental policy, rule, or method” (p. 185).)
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form of externalist metanormativism.
3 The Regress Argument
We can now state the regress problem more precisely, and see why it supports
externalism. My strategy here will be slightly indirect: I will give an argument
for externalism, based on the threat of infinite regress, that applies to agents with
unbounded capacities for theoretical and practical reasoning (of whom I will say
more shortly). I will then argue that if externalism is true with respect to these
unbounded agents, it is true of bounded agents as well.
3.1 Stating the argument
Here is an intuitive gloss of the argument: If the normative force of any norm
N depends on the agent’s beliefs about N, then agents (or at least unbounded
agents) can’t rationally act on norms of which they’re uncertain without somehow
accounting for that uncertainty. When an agent has some credence in a conflicting
norm of the same order that disagrees with N about which options are permissible,
then the only way to account for her uncertainty is to invoke a higher-order norm.
But if she finds—as seems likely—that she has credence in conflicting norms at every
order, then she will not be able to make a rationally guided decision based on norms
of any order. Thus, the internalist view that norms only have normative force to
the extent that the agent believes them implies that, for agents who are generally
uncertain about basic normative principles, rational action is impossible. And this
conclusion seems unacceptable.
Let’s state the argument more carefully, so that we can assess it premise by
premise. To avoid repeating a cumbersome locution, I will say that an nth-order
norm N authorizes an option O in situation S if either (i) S is in the domain of N
and N implies that O is permissible in S or (ii) in any minimal variant of S that
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merely alters A’s nth-order normative beliefs to place her within the domain of N ,
N would imply that O is permissible. Likewise, N deauthorizes O in S if either (i)
S is in the domain of N and N implies that O is impermissible in S or (ii) in any
minimal variant of S that merely alters A’s nth-order normative beliefs to place her
within the domain of S, N would imply that O is impermissible.
The Regress Argument for Externalism
P1. An agent A is rationally permitted to choose option O in situation S only if
there is some true subjective norm N such that (i) N authorizes O in S and
(ii) A’s beliefs place her in the domain of N .
P2. If internalism is true, then for any true nth-order norm Nni that authorizes an
option O, if A also assigns positive credence to some rival nth-order norm Nnj
that deauthorizes O, then A’s beliefs do not place her in the domain of Nni ,
unless there is some true higher-order norm Np (p > n) that authorizes O in
light of A’s nth-order normative beliefs, and A’s pth-order normative beliefs
place her in the domain of Np.11
L1. If (i) internalism is true and (ii) for all n ≤ m, A has positive credence in some
nth-order norm that deauthorizes O, then A is permitted to choose O only if
there is some norm of order greater than m that authorizes O and such that A
assigns no credence to any norm of the same order that deauthorizes O. [from
P1, P2]12
11This premise is meant to allow that A is permitted to choose O on the basis of her nth-
order normative beliefs alone, even under nth-order normative uncertainty, so long as all the
nth-order norms in which she has positive credence authorize O. First, I assume that norms can
be freely conjoined and disjoined, with the disjunction N1∨N2∨ ...∨Nn yielding a (generally non-
comprehensive) norm whose choice set in situation S is the intersection of the choice sets of norms
N1–Nn. Thus, if A is uncertain between various nth-order norms, but assigns positive credence to
at least one true norm, and all the nth-order norms to which she assigns positive credence imply
that O is permissible, then there is a true nth-order norm to which she assigns credence 1 that
authorizes O (viz., the disjunction of all the nth-order norms in which she has positive credence).
Because she assigns that norm credence 1, she presumably meets the belief conditions that place
her in its domain. But second, even if A is not certain of any nth-order norm that authorizes O,
P2 asserts that she must resort to a higher-order norm in order to permissibly choose O only when
she assigns positive credence to some nth-order norm that deauthorizes O.
12How does this follow? By P1, A is permitted to choose O only if there is some norm on the
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P3. Necessarily, for any agent A facing an option O, and for any ordinal n, A
is rationally required to have positive credence in some nth-order norm that
deauthorizes O.
L2. If internalism is true, then, necessarily, an unbounded agent who satisfies
all the requirements of epistemic rationality is never rationally permitted to
choose any practical option. [from L1, P3]
P4. It’s at least sometimes possible for an unbounded agent to make choices in a
way that satisfies all the requirements of both epistemic and practical ratio-
nality.
C. Internalism is false. [from L2, P4]13
Several remarks are immediately in order. First, what is the intended target of
the argument—an “unbounded agent”? Unbounded agents, in the sense I have in
mind, represent a particular limited idealization of human agency. An unbounded
agent (i) has conceptual resources at least as rich as our own, (ii) maintains proba-
bilistically coherent beliefs about all the propositions she can construct from those
conceptual resources, (iii) assigns probability 1 to all logical truths and probability
0 to all logical falsehoods, (iv) can instantaneously and costlessly update her beliefs
in response to new evidence, and (v) has perfect introspective/recollective access to
basis of which she is rationally permitted to choose it. By P2, a norm does not meet this condition
if there is a rival norm of the same order that deauthorizes O and to which A assigns positive
credence. Any subjective norm is either of order ≤ m or of order > m, since any norm either is or
is not sensitive to the agent’s beliefs about norms of some order ≥ m. So, if no norm of order ≤ m
meets the conditions necessary for A to permissibly choose O on the basis of it, then either no
norm meets these condition (and A is not rationally permitted to choose O, as per P1), or there
is a norm that meets these conditions of order > m.
13This presentation of the regress problem was originally inspired by remarks in Weatherson
(2014), though I now take Weatherson to be making a slightly different argument (more like
the “Simple Argument” for externalism, introduced in the next section). Sepielli seems to have
something like the preceding argument in mind in this passage: “We can imagine someone who
is...uncertain at all levels [of subjective normativity]. Indeed, one would suspect that this blanket
uncertainty is typical. For who among us is certain about morality, let alone such esoterica as 8th-
order, or 1,000th-order, normative uncertainty? But recall what animated our Divider [someone
who recognizes both objective and subjective ‘oughts’] in the first place: that we cannot guide our
behavior by norms about which we are uncertain. It would seem to follow from this that someone
who is uncertain ‘all the way up’ will be unable to guide her behavior by norms at all” (Sepielli,
2018b, p. 792).
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her own beliefs and evidence.14
Unbounded agents are, we might say, “computationally omniscient,” in the sense
that they face no purely computational constraints: For instance, any reasoning
that a human being could carry out with unlimited time, pencils, and paper, an
unbounded agent can carry out at no cost in time or resources. But unbounded
agents are not “a priori omniscient”—they do not have perfect a priori insight
that leads them to assign probability 1 to all a priori truths and probability 0 to
all a priori falsehoods. Both these features play an important role in the Regress
Argument: If we consider less idealized agents for whom deliberation is costly, we
may have grounds to reject P2 (see Tarsney, ms). If we consider more idealized a
priori omniscient agents, we could reject P3 (assuming that normative truths are
a priori). But for this sort of agent, the question of internalism vs. externalism is
moot anyway, since they are immune from normative uncertainty or false belief.
If the Regress Argument concerns unbounded agents, what does it have to do
with bounded agents like us? My claim is that, if externalism is true of unbounded
agents, then it is true of bounded agents as well: (i) This conditional is intuitively
plausible. It would be odd if internalism, which seems to place greater deliberative
demands on agents (by requiring them to account for their uncertainty about norms
that externalism says they should simply take for granted), were true of bounded
agents but not of unbounded agents, when unbounded agents are, if anything, more
capable of meeting the deliberative demands that internalism creates. (ii) There is
plausibly a sort of limit relationship between bounded and unbounded rationality.15
Boundedly rational agents like us are doing our best to approximate the choices
we would make if we were unboundedly rational. Thus, if the bounds on our de-
14My primary focus in this paper is on the regress problem as it presents itself to agents who
are unbounded in this sense. Though my primary conclusions apply to bounded agents as well (as
I explain shortly), a distinct set of problems related to metanormative decision-making and the
enkratic externalist view I propose in §4 arise in the context of bounded rationality (including a
version of the well-known regress problems for boundedly rational deliberation discussed by Winter
(1975), Elster (1977, 1983) Lipman (1991), Smith (1991), and Lin (2014), among others). I discuss
these issues in a companion piece (Tarsney, ms).
15Thanks to Owen Cotton-Barratt for this suggestion.
13
liberative capacities are relaxed (e.g., as the cost of a unit of computation in time
or other resources goes to zero), our choices should eventually tend toward those
of an unbounded agent (except in some edge cases, e.g., where reaching the cor-
rect conclusion requires performing a computational supertask or where the goal is
to truthfully answer the question “Are you an unbounded agent?”). But if inter-
nalism were true of us and externalism true of unbounded agents, then this limit
relationship would be violated: There would be a qualitative divide between the
requirements of rationality that apply to each type of agent that, in many choice
situations, no finite augmentation of the boundedly rational agent could overcome.
A bounded and an unbounded agent in the same choice situation could be required
to choose different options, even when the difference in their deliberative capacities
seems entirely irrelevant.16
Now, to the premises. P1 is meant to be trivial. It says simply that an option
is rationally permissible only if there’s some true subjective norm that says it’s
permissible. A subjective norm is just a set of propositions saying that certain
options are and aren’t permissible in certain choice situations and describing the
normative features of those choice situations in virtue of which particular options are
or aren’t permissible. So P1 is just an instance of the T-schema: If O is permissible
in S, then it’s true that O is permissible in S, so there’s some true norm (indeed,
infinitely many true norms) asserting that O is permissible in S.17
P4 should also be relatively uncontroversial. It simply asserts that the consequent
16For instance, suppose that (i) the true second-order norm is MFO (“choose an option for
which the total probability of comprehensive first-order norms that permit it is maximal”), (ii)
this norm has external force with respect to unbounded agents, (iii) you are in a choice situation
where MFO requires choosing option O, and this is not computationally difficult to figure out, but
(iv) you are certain or nearly certain that the true second-order norm is MFT (“choose an option
permitted by a comprehensive first-order norm whose probability is maximal”), which prescribes
option P . In this case, the gap between bounded and unbounded agents seems irrelevant (since the
computational demands of the situation are modest), but if externalism were true of unbounded
agents and internalism true of bounded agents, then you would be rationally required to make a
different choice than an unbounded agent in the same situation.
17Condition (ii) of P1, requiring that A’s beliefs place her in the domain of N , is required for N
to not merely authorize but imply the permissibility of O. If N is an external norm whose scope
does not depend on A’s beliefs, then this condition is trivially satisfied.
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of L2 should be considered a reductio, i.e., we should not accept the conclusion that
an unbounded and epistemically rational agent is never permitted to do anything.
I will take it for granted that this is correct.
The pressure points of the Regress Argument are P2 and P3. P2 is not a tauto-
logical consequence of the definition of internalism, but rests on a substantive claim
about the motivations for internalism. What internalism asserts, formally, is that
whether an nth-order norm applies to an agent A depends on A’s nth-order nor-
mative beliefs. What motivates this assertion, presumably, is the idea that rational
choice must be guided by (or at least cohere with) norms that the agents accepts and
that, as Sepielli puts it, “we cannot guide our behavior by norms about which we are
uncertain” (Sepielli, 2018b, p. 792). P2 allows that, on the internalist conception
of rationality, I can sometimes guide my behavior by nth-order norms of which I
am uncertain, but only if I have taken account of that uncertainty—meaning, at
minimum, that I accept some higher-order norm that authorizes me to act despite
my nth-order uncertainty.
P3 asserts a limited epistemic modesty requirement on normative beliefs—it
claims that, when it comes to basic normative principles, there are few if any justified
certainties. This could be justified by the standard Bayesian regularity assumption
that agents should not assign credence 1 or 0 to anything except logical truths
and falsehoods. I find the arguments for regularity compelling (for a representative
statement of these arguments, see Ha´jek (2003, pp. 31–2)), but you don’t need
to accept full-blown regularity in order to accept P3. First, P3 applies only to
normative beliefs, not beliefs in general. And second, it does not require that an
agent assign positive credence to every norm, but merely that at every level of
normativity, she should be at least a little uncertain about the choiceworthiness
of any given option. This seems plausible simply by reflection on the difficulty
of normative theorizing, setting aside more general arguments for regularity. In
assessing and assigning probabilities to norms, we have much less to go on than we
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do, say, in the physical sciences, which are taken to be a paradigm example of a
domain in which certainty is unattainable.18
P3 can also be substantially weakened, at the cost of strengthening P4. For
instance, we could weaken P3 to assert merely that, for most agents in most choice
situations, it is permissible to be uncertain at each level of normativity about the
permissibility of each option. We would then have to strengthen P4 to assert that
for most agents in most choice situations, no rationally permissible set of credences
should put the agent in a position where no option is rationally permissible. We
could even allow that it is epistemically irrational to be uncertain at every level of
subjective normativity (giving up P3 entirely), and simply hold that it should not be
impossible for an agent who is in fact uncertain in this way to satisfy the demands of
practical rationality—that is, the penalty for general normative uncertainty should
not be total practical paralysis.
The premises of the Regress Argument, then, are at least prima facie plausible.
But the internalist can still lodge objections. I will consider two such objections,
based on internalist responses to the regress problem in the recent literature.
3.2 Fixed-point approaches: convergence and contraction
The simplest way to avoid the problems posed by an endless regress is to end the
regress, after some limited number of steps. The regress of higher-order norms might
have such a happy ending, if the following hypothesis were true:
Convergence For any agent A in any situation S (perhaps excluding a few patho-
logical cases), if A’s credences are epistemically rational, then there is some
n such that all nth- and higher-order norms in which A has positive credence
authorize the same set of options in S.
Convergence would let the internalist escape the Regress Argument by denying
18For more extended defense of epistemic modesty with respect to basic normative principles,
see for instance Sepielli (2010, pp. 8–30) and Tarsney (2017, pp. 2-8).
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P3. But why think that it’s true? The most promising argument in this direction
comes from Trammell (forthcoming), who shows that convergence is guaranteed
under certain strong assumptions: in particular, when for every n, the agent has
positive credence in only finitely many nth-order norms, all of which are cardinal,
complete, and “compromising” (meaning that they assign each option a cardinal
value strictly in between the minimum and maximum values assigned to it by the
(n − 1)-order norms in which she has positive credence). (Under these assump-
tions, convergence is guaranteed only at transfinite levels of the metanormative
hierarchy. To guarantee convergence at finite levels, further strong assumptions are
needed.) But various natural and widely discussed metanormative theories violate
these conditions—e.g., My Favorite Theory is not compromising, and My Favorite
Option is at least on its face non-cardinal. And more obviously, many first-order
normative theories are non-cardinal and/or incomplete. So these results, while in-
teresting and important, do not seem like a general solution to the regress problem.
Sepielli (2014b) suggests another hypothesis that bears some resemblance to
Convergence.
Contraction For any agent A in any situation S (perhaps excluding a few patho-
logical cases), if A’s credences are epistemically rational, then the set of op-
tions that some nth-order norm authorizes will contract monotonically as n
increases.19
If Contraction is true, in other words, the set of options that might be permissible
can only ever get smaller, never larger, as we ascend the hierarchy toward higher-
and-higher-order norms. This means that, if A has only finitely many options in S,
then the set of possibly-permissible options must eventually stabilize: There must
be some n such that for all p > n, the set of options authorized by some pth-order
norm in which A has positive credence is identical to the set of options authorized
19Sepielli suggests this hypothesis, but doesn’t fully endorse it or claim that it solves the regress
problem—see Sepielli (2014b, p. 539).
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by some nth-order norm in which A has positive credence.
Contraction is more modest and hence more plausible than Convergence (though
not strictly weaker). But it’s not clear that, even if it were true, it would do
anything to resolve the regress problem, unless some more ambitious hypothesis like
Convergence were also true. The fact that, across all nth- and higher-order norms,
the same set of options are possibly permissible (i.e., authorized by some norm in
which I have positive credence) does not let me conclude that any of those options
in particular is in fact permissible. To illustrate the point, Contraction is trivially
true for any agent whose credences satisfy regularity, since for every option O and
every n, she will have positive credence in some nth-order norm implying that O
is permissible. For such an agent, the set of possibly-permissible options will never
expand as she ascends the hierarchy, but only because it never contracts. This
presumably does not mean that she is rationally permitted to choose any option in
any choice situation.
3.3 Sepielli’s view
Elsewhere, Sepielli suggests a different approach to the regress problem.20 He starts
by drawing a distinction between conscious uncertainty and dispositional uncer-
tainty. A rational agent, he claims, may be dispositionally uncertain without being
consciously uncertain. And if she acts on a norm N of which she is dispositionally
but not consciously uncertain, without considering alternative norms, her act is still
in an important sense rationally guided, despite her dispositional uncertainty. If we
interpret the Regress Argument as referring to dispositional uncertainty (as I will),
this suggests a way of rejecting P2: We might hold that an agent can satisfy the
belief conditions that place her in the domain of an internal nth-order Nni , even if
she has credence in rival nth-order norms that disagree with N about which options
are permissible, so long as that nth-order uncertainty remains merely dispositional
20This approach is spelled out at greatest length in Sepielli (2014a), but see also Sepielli (2012,
pp. 52ff) and Sepielli (2018b, p. 793).
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rather than conscious.
To assess this strategy, we need to know exactly what is meant by “conscious”
and “dispositional” uncertainty. Here is how Sepielli explains the distinction.
I think we need to distinguish between two types of uncertainty. The
first is dispositional, not necessarily conscious, the sort of attitude I have
towards any claim I wouldn’t bet my life on. The second is conscious,
involving a feeling of directionlessness, the kind that appears when I de-
liberate, and disappears when I’m “in the zone” [emphasis added]. I am
uncertain in only the first sense about what the strings on a guitar are;
I am uncertain in both senses about what the strings on a banjo are.
That is why I can simply play an A7 on a guitar, but can play an A7 on
a banjo only by trying. (Sepielli, 2014a, p. 91)
As Sepielli concedes, however, it is unclear why the absence of this sort of conscious
uncertainty (“a feeling of directionlessness”) should make it permissible to act on
a norm N straightaway, without considering the possibility that N might be mis-
taken. He writes that “the waning of conscious uncertainty is only a solution to the
psychological problem of how we can act without [taking unguided leaps of faith].
It’s not a solution to the normative problem of how we can manage moral risks
non-recklessly” (pp. 91-2).
This leads Sepielli to a moderately pessimistic conclusion:
I think the right thing to say is that meta-rules offer us a normative
advantage by forestalling moral recklessness, rather than by eliminating
it entirely. More precisely, there is a sense in which it is better to leap
[i.e., “take a leap of faith” by acting on a norm N the truth of which
is uncertain] in the face of uncertainty about meta-rules than to leap in
the face of uncertainty about ordinary moral rules, better still to leap
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in the face of uncertainty about meta-meta-rules, and so on. (Sepielli,
2014a, p. 92)
As I understand him, Sepielli’s conclusion is that practical agents can never
fully satisfy the demands of rationality. This has some prima facie plausibility with
respect to bounded agents (which seems to be what Sepielli has in mind), but it is
much less plausible with respect to unbounded agents. And in any case, it is the
sort of conclusion we should adopt only if we are forced into it—which, as I will
shortly argue, we are not.21
Neither the fixed-point approach nor the distinction between conscious and dis-
positional uncertainty seems to rescue internalism from the threat of regress. I
conclude, therefore, that the Regress Argument gives us persuasive—though cer-
tainly still far from conclusive—reason to accept externalism.22 In the next section,
we will see where this leaves us vis-a`-vis normative uncertainty.
4 Enkratic externalism
On pain of regress, it appears, we must conclude that at least one norm has belief-
independent force, such that an unbounded agent is permitted (if not required) to
act as that norm dictates even if she assigns positive credence to conflicting norms.
21For further discussion of Sepielli’s view, see Riedener (2015, pp. 25–30).
22Spelling out the regress problem as we have in this section helps us identify several escape
routes for the internalist that are not obvious at first glance. In addition to the two we have
considered—denying P3 in order to achieve convergence or denying P2 by allowing that agents
may act in the face of merely dispositional uncertainty—there are at least three other possibilities:
First, we could deny P2 by proposing some threshold less than certainty at which an agent may
permissibly choose an option O based on her nth-order normative beliefs: e.g., a “Lockean thresh-
old” for full belief, a knowledge norm, or a requirement that the probability assigned to nth-order
norms that deauthorize O be “de minimis” or “rationally negligible” (Smith, 2014). Second, we
could deny P3 by holding that (i) agents are rationally required to assign probability 1 to all
subjective normative truths and (ii) agents who violate this requirement of epistemic rationality
will be unable to satisfy the requirements of practical rationality. (Claim (i) bears some resem-
ble to the “Fixed Point Thesis” defended in Titelbaum (2015), although Titlebaum only claims
that rationality prohibits false belief about the requirements of rationality, not that it prohibits
any positive credence in false norms of rationality.) Third, we could deny P4 and hold that even
unbounded agents cannot fully satisfy the demands of rationality, unless they are endowed with a
degree of normative omniscience that lets them escape the uncertainty demanded by P3. I don’t
find these responses particularly promising, but I won’t try to evaluate them here.
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There are, of course, many norms of various orders to which we could attribute
this external status. But I will propose that we should attribute belief-independent
normative force to just a single norm of practical rationality: the enkratic principle
(EP), correctly formulated. Let’s call this view enkratic externalism.
4.1 Motivating enkratic externalism
A fairly standard formulation of the enkratic principle is as follows:
EP1 It is rationally required of any agent A that, if she believes she objectively
ought to choose option O, then she chooses O.23
There is a substantial debate about how exactly to formulate EP, much of which
need not concern us here. But one issue that very much does concern us is that
familiar formulations of EP take no account of uncertainty. If “belief” is compatible
with uncertainty, then EP1 is simply false, since an agent may believe that she
objectively ought to choose O for relatively weak reasons, but have positive credence
that she has very strong reasons to choose some other option instead, such that on
balance it is not rational for her to choose O. If “belief” implies certainty, then EP1
is never or almost never applicable to actual agents.
Wedgwood (2013) points this out and tries to generalize EP in a way that ac-
commodates uncertainty about what one objectively ought to do. He concludes that
the right generalization is a principle requiring agents to maximize expected choice-
worthiness. Adapted slightly to fit the idiolect of this paper, Wedgwood’s version
of EP can be stated as follows:
EP2 (MEC) It is rationally required of any agent in any choice situation that she
choose an option that maximizes expected choiceworthiness.
23Perhaps the most familiar formulation of EP is: “If A believes she ought to ϕ, then she
is rationally required to intend to ϕ.” I immediately substitute what I think is an improved
formulation, to avoid distracting complications. I have no strong view on the debate between
narrow- and wide-scope formulations of principles of practical rationality, but adopt the wide-
scope formulation simply because it’s weaker. I omit the usual reference to intentions in the
consequent of EP for reasons described convincingly in Reisner (2013).
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Wedgwood suggests that this expectational version of EP is “the fundamental
principle of rationality” (p. 505). The true, narrow reading of EP1 asserts a rational
requirement that, if an agent is certain that she objectively ought to choose O—in
other words, if she is certain that O is her most choiceworthy option—then she
chooses O. But this is, Wedgwood suggests, just a limiting case of the more general
rational requirement given by EP2, that agents make choices (or, for Wedgwood,
form intentions) that cohere with their beliefs about objective reasons, weighing
each potential reason for or against O in proportion to both (i) the probability that
it obtains and (ii) its strength if it does obtain.
So that we have a reasonably spelled-out version of enkratic externalism to evalu-
ate as a response to the regress problem, I will assume that Wedgwood is correct and
that EP2 is the correct generalization of EP1. Needless to say, there is a towering
literature on the strengths and weaknesses of expectational decision rules (though
largely focused on axiomatic expected utility theory, which differs in important ways
from MEC). My aim here is not to advance the debate over whether expectational
reasoning is the correct response to risk, but rather to see whether a second-order
norm like MEC can resolve the metanormative regress problem. Thus, MEC serves
as simply a plain-vanilla example of what a suitably general version of EP (and
hence of enkratic externalism) might look like. Substituting a principle that, for
instance, permits a wider range of risk attitudes or instructs agents to ignore de
minimis probabilities would not substantially change the discussion that follows.24
24Wedgwood offers further arguments for MEC in Wedgwood (2017). MEC is also defended in
MacAskill (2014), Lazar (2017), and MacAskill and Ord (forthcoming), though they don’t associate
it with EP. And I take Broome to endorse MEC, or something very much like it, e.g. in Broome
(1991) and (2013). (Broome (2013) defends a version of EP he calls Enkrasia that, apart from
some complications that aren’t relevant for our purposes, resembles a wide-scope version of the
standard principle: Rationality requires that, if an agent believes she ought to ϕ, then she intends
to ϕ (p. 170). But the “ought” Broome has in mind is “prospective” rather than objective, i.e.,
depends on the prospects of the options in a given choice situation (Ch. 3). And Broome says that
“the value of a prospect is an expected value of some sort” (p. 41). As far as I can see, this makes
Broome’s Enkrasia a version of MEC.)
For my own part, I am inclined to favor not MEC but a formulation of EP in terms of stochastic
dominance, holding that O is rationally prohibited iff there is another option P such that (i) for
any degree of choiceworthiness, P is at least as likely as O to be at least that choiceworthy and
(ii) for some degree of choiceworthiness, P is strictly more likely to be at least that choiceworthy.
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By conceding the conclusion of the Regress Argument, enkratic externalism al-
lows us to accept its premises without paradox. Whether this is enough to resolve
the regress problem is another matter, which we will take up in §5. But on face it
seems promising: MEC is a second-order norm—it is sensitive to an agent’s objec-
tive normative beliefs (her beliefs about choiceworthiness), but not to her subjective
normative beliefs (her beliefs about rational requirements). If an agent is rationally
permitted—indeed, required—to maximize expected choiceworthiness, even when
she is uncertain of MEC, then the regress of higher-order norms simply stops at
the second order. Because she can act on MEC without considering conflicting
second-order norms, there is no need to resort to higher-order metanorms.25
But I favor this principle largely because I believe that, under normal epistemic circumstances, it
is in surprisingly close agreement with MEC (while better handling some standard problem cases
for expectational decision theory). These arguments are too involved to reproduce here (but are
laid out in Tarsney (2018)). So for simplicity, I will focus in this paper on the more familiar MEC.
25It is worth noting here an interesting parallel between the metanormative regress problem
and Lewis Carroll’s famous paradox of Achilles and the Tortoise (Carroll, 1895). (Thanks to
Ben Blumson for pointing this out to me.) The regress that emerges when the Tortoise demands
that modus ponens itself be included as a premise in what started out as a simple modus ponens
inference has often been interpreted as showing that we must recognize a fundamental distinction
between rules and premises of theoretical inference. Likewise, the enkratic externalist solution
to the regress problem can be understood as claiming that EP is a rule rather than a potential
premise of practical reasoning, just as modus ponens is a rule rather than a potential premise of
theoretical reasoning.
Notably, however, Carroll’s regress doesn’t involve any uncertainty about the rules of inference.
(The Tortoise doesn’t doubt the validity of modus ponens inferences, but simply requests that
each instance of the modus ponens schema that figures in the argument be “written down” as
a premise.) And it does not obviously support the conclusion that the normative force of valid
inference rules is independent of the agent’s beliefs about those rules. Plausibly, then, there are
two distinct regress problems that can each arise in both the theoretical and practical domains:
(i) the regress of theoretical/practical reasoning under certainty about basic norms, which shows
that at least some norms must be accorded a special role distinct from that of accepted premises
(for useful discussion of the direct practical analogue of Carroll’s paradox, see §4.2 of Kolodny and
Brunero (2018) and citations therein) and (ii) the regress of theoretical/practical reasoning under
uncertainty about basic norms, which shows that the normative force of at least some norms is
belief-independent.
Carroll’s is just one of several regress problems in epistemology that in some ways parallel the
metanormative regress problem. These include, for instance, the classic skeptical regress generated
by the demand that all beliefs have a non-circular inferential justification; the problem of higher-
order peer disagreement (Weatherson, 2013; Elga, 2010; Kelly, 2010; Christensen, 2013); and regress
problems associated with higher-order evidence more generally (Lasonen-Aarnio, 2014). There are
important parallels among these problems, though I think it would be a mistake to treat them all
as mere facets of a single underlying problem. But constraints of both space and expertise forbid
me from attempting any detailed exploration of these parallels.
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4.2 Enkratic externalism vs. internalism
Even if it can resolve the regress problem, enkratic externalism still faces challenges
from two directions: from internalists like Sepielli, and from first-order externalists
like Weatherson. From the internalist direction, the challenge is to explain how it
could be rational—let alone rationally required—of an agent to act on a norm that
she does not accept. This challenge need not rely on the tendentious claim that
an agent cannot rationally act on any norm of which she is at all uncertain. The
internalist can instead ask: Suppose an agent believes that MEC is certainly or
almost certainly false. Suppose she is certain, or nearly certain, of a rival subjective
norm that gives conflicting advice for the choice she confronts. And suppose that her
evidence supports these beliefs—e.g., she has been exposed to compelling arguments
against MEC and for the rival norm. How can it be rational for this agent to follow
MEC rather than the norm that she justifiably believes to be much more probably
correct? This seems to gratuitously offend the idea that leads us to subjective norms
in the first place, that rational choice should be guided by an agent’s beliefs about
the normatively significant features of her choice situation. Indeed, for this reason,
enkratic externalism seems paradoxically to offend the essential spirit of the enkratic
principle itself.
There is certainly a prima facie tension here, but I think there is ultimately no
contradiction. Enkratic externalism follows naturally from a particular conception
of rationality: Rationality is about coherence, and practical rationality is about
coherence between an agent’s normative beliefs and her choices. But more specifi-
cally, rationality is about coherence between an agent’s choices and her beliefs about
objective reasons—not her beliefs about rationality.
Why make this distinction? The normative force of rationality, plausibly, is that
it aligns my choices with my beliefs about the features of my actions that matter.
And while it matters that I do what I have most objective reason to do, it does not
matter that I act rationally, except insofar as acting rationally is generally conducive
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to doing what I have most objective reason to do. (For a forceful exposition of this
point, see Kolodny (2005).) Thus, there is nothing necessarily irrational in doing
something I believe to be irrational, except insofar as I also believe myself to be
acting against my objective reasons. An agent who is motivated by the things that
matter need not guide her choices by the former sort of belief. This resolves the
apparent incongruity of a normative theory that is belief-sensitive in some regards
and belief-insensitive in others: Rationality is, as a conceptual matter, about making
your choices cohere with your beliefs about objective reasons, so its requirements are
sensitive to these beliefs alone.
This defense of enkratic externalism in particular also points to a second argu-
ment for externalism in general, distinct from the Regress Argument. Whatever the
correct conceptual analysis of rationality turns out to be, it will yield some con-
clusion of the form ∀x(Rational(x) ↔ ϕ(x)) (where x might range over agents,
attitudes, options/choices, or something else). The simplest argument for exter-
nalism is that, whatever the content of ϕ turns out to be, there is some rational
requirement—namely, to satisfy ϕ—that is incumbent on any agent regardless of
her normative beliefs, because satisfying ϕ is just what it means to be rational. Put
a bit more generally, the argument is this:
The Simple Argument for Externalism
P1. There is some ϕ such that (i) ∀x(Rational(x)→ ϕ(x)) and (ii) it’s possible
for an agent to have credence less than 1 that she is rationally required to
satisfy ϕ.26
C. There is at least one true norm N (viz., the rational requirement to satisfy ϕ)
that applies to all agents regardless of their beliefs about N .
This argument, as much as the Regress Argument, convinces me that we must
26I substitute a conditional for a biconditional in P1 since it’s all the argument requires.
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accept externalism. Whatever the true theory of rationality, as soon as we have
stated it in its full generality, we have stated principles of rational requirement that
apply to all agents whatsoever—meaning, to all agents regardless of their beliefs
about rationality.27 Note also that the Simple Argument applies directly to both
bounded and unbounded agents, so its relevance to bounded agents like us does
not depend on any conditional linkage between the requirements of bounded and
unbounded rationality.
Still, we should acknowledge that any form of externalism carries a genuine cost.
We must give up some of the desire for “action-guidance” that seems to motivate the
search for first- and second-order subjective norms. If enkratic externalism is right,
then the norms of rationality can help us navigate our uncertainties about objective
reasons (including both empirical and normative uncertainties), but cannot help us
navigate our uncertainties about rationality itself.
4.3 Enkratic externalism vs. first-order externalism
I have defended enkratic externalism against the worries of internalists, but what
about the opposite view, first-order externalism? Why should we attribute external
normative force to EP, rather than to first-order norms like utilitarianism or Kan-
tianism? The debate between first-order externalism and metanormativism is far
too large to enter into here.28 So I will limit myself to two observations: First, as
27Arguments like this are made by Broome (2013, p. 93), Bykvist (2013, p. 133), and Weatherson
(2014, pp. 156–7). Weatherson puts the point as follows: “There is a worry that externalism is
not sufficiently action guiding, and can’t be a norm that agents can live by. But any philosophical
theory whatsoever is going to have to say something about how to judge agents who ascribe some
credence to a rival theory. That’s true whether the theory is the first-order theory that Jeremy
Bentham offers, or the second-order theory that Andrew Sepielli offers. Once you’re in the business
of theorising at all, you’re going to impose an external standard on an agent, one that an agent
may, in good faith and something like good conscience, sincerely reject. The externalist says that
it’s better to have that standard be one concerned with what is genuinely valuable in the world,
rather than a technical standard about resolving moral uncertainty. But every theorist has to be
a little bit externalist; the objector who searches for a thoroughly subjective standard is going to
end up like Ponce de Leon.”
28For the first-order externalist position, see Weatherson (2014, 2019), Harman (2015), and
Hedden (2016). For metanormativist replies, see Sepielli (2016, 2018a), Johnson-King (2018), and
MacAskill and Ord (forthcoming), among others. Podgorski (forthcoming) offers an objection to
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a general principle of rational choice under uncertainty, MEC seems significantly
more plausible than first-order principles like utilitarianism or Kantianism. I have
argued that MEC, or some other version of EP, plausibly falls out of a conceptual
analysis of rationality. By contrast, first-order norms like maximize expected total
pleasure minus pain or don’t intentionally deceive other agents cannot (pace certain
Kantians) be plausibly derived from the mere concept of rationality. Rather, they
reflect particular theories of what objective reasons there are in the world (e.g., rea-
sons for producing pleasure or against deception) which, even if they are true, are not
truths about what it means to be a coherent practical agent. Second, the first-order
externalist position is incompatible with any version of EP, including the extremely
modest reading of EP1 that asserts only that agents are rationally required, if they
are certain that O is more choiceworthy than any alternative, to choose O. If, say,
subjective hedonistic utilitarianism is an external first-order norm, then an agent
who is justifiably certain that she has most objective reason to act in ways favor
the interests of her friends and family is rationally prohibited from doing what she
is certain she has most objective reason to do. So whatever you think of generalized
versions of EP like MEC, if you find any version of EP compelling, then you have
powerful reason to reject first-order externalism.
5 Have we blocked the regress?
Although I initially framed the regress problem as an argument for normative exter-
nalism, that doesn’t mean that conceding any form of externalism is enough to make
the problem go away. In the last section I suggested that, since EP is a second-order
norm (being sensitive only to an agent’s beliefs about objective norms), attributing
belief-independent force to EP stops the regress at the second order: Since we are
permitted to act on EP despite our second-order uncertainties, we are not required
first-order externalism that is, to my mind, all but conclusive. I give my own defense of metanor-
mativism and reply to the first-order externalists in Tarsney (2017, Chs 2–3).
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to consider third- or higher-order norms. But does EP alone allow us to set aside
all our second-order normative uncertainties? That depends on whether EP is a
comprehensive norm, that settles all questions about rational permissibility, or a
partial norm that simply constrains the field of subjective norms. If the latter, then
the regress problem remains unresolved: for even if an agent is rationally required
to comply with EP, this alone may not be enough to tell her what to do. And if all
other norms besides EP have merely belief-dependent force, then she may have to
go on the same fruitless quest up the hierarchy of metanorms that pure internalism
condemns her to.
5.1 Prohibition without permission
Two worries about the comprehensiveness of EP deserve our attention. First: The
requirement to maximize expected choiceworthiness, as stated in the last section,
does not necessarily tell an agent that she is permitted to choose any option that
maximizes expected choiceworthiness. It rather prohibits her from choosing an op-
tion when there is some alternative that has greater expected choiceworthiness. This
distinction is significant because more than one option can have maximal expected
choiceworthiness. This can happen in at least two ways: First, there can be ties.
Second, the expected choiceworthiness of an option can be undefined, in which case
its expected choiceworthiness is maximal but the choiceworthiness of the option
with the greatest defined expectation is maximal as well (since the expectation of
an option with undefined expectation is, trivially, neither greater nor less than the
expectation of any other option).
This opens a loophole through which the regress problem can reappear: EP (qua
MEC) eliminates all options whose expected choiceworthiness is not maximal, but if
this leaves more than one option, then we still have a non-trivial choice situation with
multiple options and no belief-independent norm that tells us how to choose between
them. The solution is to revise our statement of MEC so that it not only states
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a rational requirement, but gives comprehensive necessary and sufficient conditions
for rational permissibility.
EP3 (MEC+) For any agent A, choice situation S, and option O, A is rationally
permitted to choose O in S if and only if no option in S has greater expected
choiceworthiness than O.
This closes the loophole: Now, MEC not only prohibits options with non-maximal
expectations, but permits agents to choose any option with a maximal expectation.
5.2 Normalization uncertainty
There is another, more challenging way in which metanormative regress can reap-
pear within the constraints of enkratic externalism: To determine the expected
choiceworthiness of an option under normative uncertainty, we must first normalize
the choiceworthiness scales of rival objective norms. That is, we need to say what
increment on the choiceworthiness scale of one normative theory (e.g., how many
units of total welfare) corresponds to a given increment on the choiceworthiness
scale of another theory (e.g., a given unit of average welfare). Even if she is fully
committed to maximizing expected choiceworthiness, an agent may nevertheless be
uncertain how to normalize rival theories. She might assign some credence to various
statistical normalization methods (e.g., normalizing theories at the range (Lockhart,
2000) or variance (MacAskill, 2014) of their choiceworthiness assignments), some to
“content-based” normalization methods (Tarsney, 2017), and some to the view that
the correct normalization is simply brute, conditional on which she distributes her
credence widely over a range of plausible-seeming normalizations (Riedener, forth-
coming). This suggests, once again, that MEC is not genuinely comprehensive:
MEC says that I should maximize an expectation of the various choiceworthiness
hypotheses to which I assign positive credence, but which expectation—relative to
which normalization? Even if she is fully committed to MEC, therefore, an agent
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may be uncertain between several second-order norms: the combination of MEC
with each normalization method in which she has positive credence. And if she is
uncertain how to respond to that uncertainty, the regress is back in business.
One response for the enkratic externalist is simply to go externalist about the
normalization method: All agents, regardless of their beliefs or evidence, are ra-
tionally required not just to maximize expected choiceworthiness but to normalize
theories in a particular way (say, by variance normalization) and then maximize
expected choiceworthiness. But while it is at least plausible that a version of the
enkratic principle like MEC can be derived from a conceptual analysis of rationality,
and therefore has belief-independent rational requiring force, it is much less plausi-
ble that any particular intertheoretic normalization method is somehow baked into
the concept of rationality.
Here is a more promising response: Normalization uncertainty is not a challenge
to MEC, but just another instance of exactly the sort of uncertainty that MEC is
meant to deal with. If an agent is committed to MEC but uncertain how to normalize
the theories in which she has positive credence, she should simply take a probability-
weighted average over the various possible normalizations—i.e., an expectation. For
instance, suppose she is uncertain between classical utilitarianism and a critical-level
theory that assigns twice as much weight to the interests of those below the critical
level as to those above it. She might be uncertain whether the critical-level theory
cares more about the worse-off than classical utilitarianism, or cares less about the
better-off, and hence be uncertain how to normalize the theories. But all she needs
to do to apply MEC under these circumstances is to compute expectations using
each normalization, and then take a probability-weighted average of the results.
On face, this response looks naive and inadequate: To “take an average” over
several possible normalization methods, the agent must be able to normalize the
outputs of those normalization methods—i.e., to normalize the expectations that she
calculates using each normalization method. It seems that she might be uncertain
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how to do this. And so once again, we are just headed for another regress.
But I think—albeit tentatively—that this problem can be overcome, and that
the “average the normalizations” response is ultimately on the right track. The key
to making this response work is a particular way of thinking about the problem
of intertheoretic normalization, which MacAskill (2014) has dubbed the “universal
scale” approach. On this view, there is a determinate set of choiceworthiness proper-
ties, which all normative theories as such are in the business of assigning to options.
Different normative theories differ in which properties they assign to which options,
but their assignments share the same codomain. On this view, uncertainty about
how to normalize two theories—say, classical and critical-level utilitarianism—is to
be understood as uncertainty between various “amplifications” (i.e., rescalings) of
one or both theories. For instance, I might assign credence only to a single version of
classical utilitarianism, while distributing my credence between two versions of the
critical level view, one that assigns the same weight as classical utilitarianism to the
worse off and another that assigns the same weight as classical utilitarianism to the
better off (cf. MacAskill (2014, pp. 134–142)). If my uncertainty how to normalize
the two theories can be understood in this way, then there is no further obstacle to
applying MEC. In effect, we simply distinguish theories at a more fine-grained level
so that instead of two theories that I’m uncertain how to normalize, I have three
theories that I’m certain how to normalize.
I admit that I am not entirely sure of this response. In particular, I don’t find
MacAskill’s metaphysical defense of the universal scale approach entirely convinc-
ing.29 Still, I suspect that something like MacAskill’s story is ultimately correct.
Roughly, all objective normative theories are theories of the same concept (viz.,
choiceworthiness), and as such it is more plausible to think of them as drawing from
the same set of choiceworthiness properties and simply disagreeing about which
29For MacAskill’s defense, see MacAskill (2014, pp. 149–157). For my reservations, see Tarsney
(2017, pp. 209–212). See also Riedener (2015, Ch. 3), who defends a thesis in the same spirit as
MacAskill’s, called “absolutism,” that would also serve my purposes in this section.
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properties to assign to which option than to think of each theory as inventing its
own set of choiceworthiness properties out of whole cloth, entirely disjoint from the
properties mentioned by any other theory. This allows for uncertainty about how to
normalize pairs of theories like classical and critical level utilitarianism—it simply
casts that uncertainty in a way that is tractable to expectational reasoning. Giving
a fully worked-out defense of this view is (at least) a paper-length project in its
own right. But the idea that normalization uncertainty can be understood in this
way is prima facie plausible and, to my knowledge, there is no compelling argu-
ment against it. So I conclude that, although there is an important residual worry
here, the expectational version of enkratic externalism has reasonable prospects for
avoiding a vicious regress brought on by normalization uncertainty.
6 Conclusion
I had two objectives in this paper: first, to develop and defend the regress argument
for normative externalism, but second, to defend a metanormativist rather than
a first-order version of externalism as the best response to the threat of regress.
Specifically, I have argued that we need attribute belief-independent force to only
one norm: the enkratic principle, in some comprehensive formulation that covers
choices under uncertainty. Enkratic externalism solves the metanormative regress
problem by providing us with a comprehensive second-order norm that obviates any
need to consider the full hierarchy of higher-order norms.
With respect to both objectives, it seems to me that the preceding arguments
are persuasive but hardly conclusive, and leave a great deal more to be said. Future
research might fruitfully explore (i) alternative characterizations of basic concepts
like normative internalism/externalism and metanorms, (ii) internalist responses to
the regress problem (e.g. generalizing Trammell’s convergence results discussed in
§3.2, or exploring one of escape routes noted in footnote 22), (iii) other forms of
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metanormativist externalism (based on different versions of the enkratic principle
or entirely different second- or higher-order metanorms), or (iv) the challenge posed
by normalization uncertainty for expectational metanorms like MEC.
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